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Medicare’s Use of
Risk Adjustment
Gerald F. Kominski, PhD, Consultant
OVERVIEW – Medicare accounts for expected differences in resource needs
of patients or health plan enrollees by risk-adjusting the payments it makes
to health care facilities, such as hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and home
health agencies, and the premiums it pays to health plans. Risk adjustment
is intended to ensure that payments or premiums are adequate for patients
or plan enrollees who require more resources than average in order to protect
beneficiary access as well as the financial condition of the provider or plan. At
the same time, risk adjustment lowers payments or premiums for beneficiaries
who are expected to use fewer resources to reduce incentives for providers or
plans to favor these beneficicaries. This paper describes the origins and importance of risk adjustment, summarizes current risk adjustment by Medicare,
and discusses issues and problems with risk adjustment methods.
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Medicare’s Use of Risk Adjustment
Risk adjustment has a long history in the insurance industry, predating
the development of health insurance, and it is a fundamental component
of actuarial science. For more than a century, insurance companies have
defined categories of individuals who face similar risks for some insurable
loss. With life insurance, for example, these categories are based on risk
factors, such as age and gender, and more recently measures of health
status, such as presence of certain chronic diseases, or behavior, such as
cigarette smoking. Actuarial life tables quantify the relationship between
these risk factors and the probability of dying (the insurable loss) during
a particular time period, such as the next 12 months. This relationship is
then used to determine the risk-adjusted life insurance premium for each
category of individuals.
Why do insurers risk-adjust their premiums? The simple answer is to
avoid adverse selection.1 An insurer that offers the same premium to everyone in a market who wants the insurance, termed a community-rated
premium, would be more likely to attract individuals who expect to need
the coverage. This is because the premium would reflect the average risk
of the population in that market and thus would be relatively inexpensive
for someone at high risk. As more high-risk individuals purchase that
insurance, the community-rated premium would rise to reflect the higher
average risk of the insured population. Higher premiums would, in turn,
create a disincentive for low-risk individuals to purchase policies. With
fewer low-risk individuals in the pool, this adverse selection could cause
premiums to spiral even higher, a possibility that concerns insurers enough
for them to employ risk adjustment.2
Medicare began to risk-adjust hospital payments with the implementation
of the prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services
in 1983. Previously, Medicare hospital reimbursement was based on each
facility’s actual charges for providing services to a Medicare beneficiary.
The payments automatically accounted for the fact that some patients
needed more expensive and extensive care than others. As hospital charges
went up, so did Medicare’s payments. This charge-payment dynamic
was the impetus behind Medicare’s PPS. The PPS was designed to break
the direct link between the hospital’s charges and the payment amount
so that hospitals would have financial incentives to control the costs of
providing care. In the PPS, a predetermined payment for all the services
provided during a hospital admission financially rewarded hospitals for
providing care for at a lower cost than the payment amount and penalized
inefficient hospitals. A flat payment per admission would have provided
incentives for hospitals to select the least intensive patients, stint on care,
or both. Therefore, the predetermined payment was varied based on the
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likelihood, or risk, that the cost of caring for the patient would be higher
or lower than the cost of caring for the average patient. This risk adjustment, sometimes called case mix adjustment when applied to provider
payments, is patterned after insurance industry practice.

Risk Adjustment and the Medicare Program
Risk adjustment aligns Medicare payments to providers or premiums paid
to health plans with the expected costs of providing contracted services.
Without it, patients or plan enrollees expected to incur higher-than-average
costs might have difficulty gaining access to services or they might receive
inadequate or poor quality care. Risk-adjusted payments help ensure that
providers or plans are not inappropriately advantaged or penalized if they
treat or enroll a costlier mix of patients.
Risk adjustment became necessary in the traditional Medicare program
when it began paying certain types of providers predetermined amounts
for bundles of services delivered during a specified period (Table 1).3 Beginning with inpatient hospital services, Medicare has over time changed
its facility payment systems so they are no longer based on facility-specific
costs or charges for individual services. Medicare implemented prospective,

Table 1
Medicare Payment Bundles, by Type of Provider
Payment Bundle —
All Services Provided During:

Services Excluded
from Payment Bundle

Inpatient admission plus
certain diagnostic and radiologic procedures performed
three days prior to admission

Physician professional
services

Day of care

Physician professional
services and certain high
cost outpatient procedures

60-day episode

Physician professional
services

Inpatient
Rehabilitation
Facility

Inpatient admission

Physician professional
services

Long-Term
Care Hospital

Inpatient admission

Physician professional
services

Day of care

Physician professional
services

Provider Type
Acute Care
Hospital

Skilled Nursing
Facility
Home Health
Agency

Inpatient
Psychiatric
Hospital

Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Payment Basics, www.medpac.gov/documents.cfm.
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bundled payment approaches to encourage providers to become more efficient in delivering care by allowing them to keep any difference between
the payment and the cost of care. Each payment is adjusted to reflect
the expected costs of care, based on characteristics of the patient and the
treatment that have been demonstrated to affect the risk that costs will be
higher or lower than costs associated with the average patient. This rewards
providers for delivering only necessary services and penalizes them when
costs are above the payment. Rather than paying for each service provided
during a hospital stay or a day of care in a skilled nursing facility (SNF), for
example, Medicare pays a single rate, based on historical, average costs, for
a hospital admission or a day of care in a SNF. When payments were made
for each individual service (as is done for physician payment), there was
no need for risk adjustment because the cost of providing a service was not
likely to vary across patients. Costs of providing a bundle of services such
as during a hospital admission or a day of care in a SNF do vary, however,
based on patient needs.
Risk adjustment is also an essential component of Medicare’s managed care
option [Medicare Advantage (Part C)] in which private, Medicare-participating plans enroll Medicare beneficiaries and provide Medicare-covered
benefits in exchange for a monthly premium. In this case, risk adjustment
raises or lowers the premium Medicare pays the plan based on patient
characteristics that have been shown to affect the risk that the enrollee
will have higher or lower than average health care needs. Without risk
adjustment, premiums would not accurately reflect the expected costs of a
plan’s enrollees. This could have several consequences. Some plans would
be overpaid while others would be underpaid. This could result in access
problems for beneficiaries with less favorable risk profiles, particularly if
plans try to discourage enrollment of potentially more costly patients, for
example, by having fewer specialists available to treat particular high-cost
conditions. Plans with fewer high-cost enrollees would have a competitive
advantage over other plans. In addition, overpaying plans may prevent
them from becoming as efficient as they could in providing health care.
Further, inaccurate accounting for risk could cause Medicare to pay more
or less than intended in its managed care program.4

Provider Payments
To account for differences in risk across patients, the patient classification
system associated with a particular type of provider creates categories of
patients, called case mix groups, that are expected to have similar costs for
the payment bundle. The average cost of patients in each group is compared
with the average cost across all groups for that type of provider. This ratio,
or relative weight, is used to adjust the average (or “standard”) provider
payment so that the payment is higher for treating a patient in a costlier
group and lower for treating a patient in a less expensive group.
Each type of provider has a different patient classification system to reflect
the risk factors that affect costs and resource use. Although acute care,
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long-term care, and psychiatric hospitals all categorize patients based
on their diagnosis-related group (DRG), the relative weights associated
with the DRGs differ in each type of hospital to reflect their varying
treatments and cost structures (Table 2).
The patient classification systems require patient-level information, such
as diagnosis, functional status, or expected or actual treatment. Diagnostic
information is reported using the more than 15,000 codes included in the
International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification
(ICD-9-CM). Treatment information is reported using either ICD-9-CM procedure codes or the Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) coding system
developed by the American Medical Association to describe treatments
typically provided by physicians.
Patient functional status, which is required by the patient classification
systems for SNFs, home health agencies, and rehabilitation hospitals, is
obtained from patient assessment tools. These patient assessment tools are
administered at admission or other times during a patient’s treatment, and
they measure factors such as the ability to perform activities of daily living.
Each type of provider uses a different assessment tool and administers the
assessment at different times during the patient stay.
The relative weight for each case mix group compares the cost or resource
use of that category relative to all categories for the type of provider

Table 2
Data Used in Medicare’s Patient Classification Systems, by Type of Provider
Provider Type
Acute Care Hospital
Skilled Nursing Facility

Home Health Agency
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility
Long-Term Care Hospital
Inpatient Psychiatric Hospital

Patient Classification System

Patient Data Elements

Diagnosis-related groups

Diagnoses, surgical procedure, age, discharge
status (alive? yes/no)

Resource utilization groups

Presence of certain acute medical conditions,
need of certain services, expected or actual
use of therapy, functional status

Home health resource groups

Clinical conditions, expected need of therapy,
functional status

Inpatient rehabilitation facility casemix groups

Diagnosis requiring rehabilitation, functional
and cognitive status, age, comorbidities

Long-term care hospital diagnosisrelated groups

Diagnoses, surgical procedures,
age, discharge status (alive? yes/no)

Psychiatric diagnosis-related groups

Diagnoses, certain treatments, age, day of stay

Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Payment Basics, www.medpac.gov/documents.cfm.
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Table 3
Medicare Patient Classification Systems,
Base Payment Amounts, and Range of Relative Weights,
by Type of Provider, 2007

Provider Type

Acute Care
Hospital
Skilled Nursing
Facility†

Patient
Classification System

Base Payment
Amount ($)

Range of
Relative Weights

Diagnosis-related
groups

$5,305*
per admission

0.1000 – 19.2551

Resource utilization
groups

n u rs i n g

$142 per day

0.50 – 1.93

t h e r apy

Home Health
Agency
Inpatient
Rehabilitation
Facility
Long-Term
Care Hospital
Inpatient
Psychiatric
Hospital

$107 per day

0.43 – 2.25

Home health
resource groups

$2,339
per 60 day
episode

0.5265 – 2.8113

Inpatient rehabilitation facility case mix
groups

$12,981
per admission

0.2201 – 4.1542

Long-term care
hospital diagnosisrelated groups

$38,086
per admission

0.4175 – 3.8893

Psychiatric diagnosisrelated groups

$595 per day

0.88 – 1.22

* This includes the operating and capital (depreciation and interest on buildings and major equipment)
cost amounts.
† The base payment amount for SNFs differs for urban and rural facilities, but the relative weights are
the same. The rural nursing base payment is $136 per day and the rural therapy base payment is
$123 per day.
Source: Federal Register, 71, no. 146, July 31, 2006, pp. 43158–43198; Federal Register, 71, no. 149, August
3, 2006, pp. 44082–44180; and Federal Register, 71, no. 160, August 18, 2006, pp. 47870–48434;.

(Table 3). Using the inpatient hospital system as an example (Figure 1, next
page), Medicare’s 2007 unadjusted hospital rate for the average admission
was approximately $5,305.5 This base amount reflects historical average
hospital costs, updated to account for inflation. The relative weight for DRG
90 (simple pneumonia) is 0.6148 because patients in this category require
fewer resources, on average, than the average acute care hospital patient.
Applying the relative weight results in a risk-adjusted payment of over
$3,200 for this DRG. Similarly, the relative weight for DRG 320 (kidney and
urinary tract infection) is 0.8769. By contrast, the relative weight for DRG
548 (coronary bypass with cardiac catheterization) is 4.644, resulting in a
risk adjusted payment of almost $25,000.
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Figure 1
Medicare Acute Care Hospital Payment,
Selected Diagnosis-Related Groups, 2007
Relative	Hospital
Weight
Payment

Diagnosis-Related Group

— 5.0 ——————————————————————————————
	4.6440
$24,636	
DRG 548	Coronary bypass with
— 4.5 ——————————————————————————————
cardiac catheterization
— 4.0 ——————————————————————————————
	3.8064	 $20,193	
DRG 110 Major cardiovascular
procedure
— 3.5 ——————————————————————————————
— 3.0 ——————————————————————————————
— 2.5 ——————————————————————————————
— 2.0 ——————————————————————————————
1.9022	 $10,091
DRG 210 Hip and femur
procedures
— 1.5 ——————————————————————————————
— 1.0 ——————————————————————————————
1.000
$5,305	Unadjusted Base Payment
0.9001
$4,775	
DRG 167	Appendectomy
— 0.5 ——————————————————————————————
0.8769
$4,652	
DRG 320 Kidney and
urinary tract infection
0.6148	
$3,262	
DRG
90		Pneumonia
— 0 ——————————————————————————————
Note: Payment does not account for other adjustments in the payment system.
Source: Federal Register, 71, no. 196, October 11, 2006, pp. 60013–60025.

Plan Payments
In Medicare managed care [Medicare Advantage (Part C)] and the prescription drug benefit (Part D) per capita premiums paid to health plans are
risk-adjusted. The same process is involved in producing a risk-adjusted
premium for a health plan as in producing a risk-adjusted payment for
a provider; beneficiaries are assigned to the appropriate group, a relative
weight is determined for each group, and an average premium is adjusted by
the relative weight. The bundle of services encompassed under a premium,
however, is broader than the bundle of services delivered by an individual
provider. Premiums to health plans are intended to cover the services provided during a period of time by all providers involved in delivering medical
services. As a result, risk-adjusting premiums may be more challenging.
The monthly premiums to health plans for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part C have always been risk-adjusted, but initially the adjustment
National Health Policy Forum | www.nhpf.org



Background Paper
August 21, 2007

accounted only for demographic differences across enrollees. The first
classification system Medicare used, starting in January 1985, was based
on the enrollee’s age, sex, and other demographic characteristics as well as
institutional status and Medicaid eligibility. It did not consider health status
or clinical conditions.6 This method was widely viewed as inadequate.7
This system was replaced beginning in January 2000 with the principal
inpatient diagnostic cost groups (PIP-DCGs).8 PIP-DCGs use the principal
diagnoses from any hospital stays in the previous year to predict costs in the
upcoming year. In 2004, Medicare began using a risk adjuster that considered
the disease burden of enrollees. The system was further refined by including
diagnostic information from multiple sites of care, including outpatient and
physician office settings. This revised classification system, known as the
hierarchical condition categories (HCCs), was fully implemented by January
2007.9 For premiums paid to Part D prescription drug plans, Medicare’s risk
adjustment is based on an adaptation of the HCCs, known as the Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Prescription Drug Hierarchical Condition Categories, which relies on the same data elements as HCCs to predict
relative differences in pharmaceutical expenditures.

iSSueS in meDicare riSk aDJuStment
Risk adjustment methods require ongoing changes because of advances in
medical technology and treatment patterns as well as provider responses to
financial incentives. Without ongoing adjustments, payment accuracy can suffer. This section discusses several important issues that need to be considered
to maintain and improve Medicare’s payment systems. In some instances,
these issues may be better addressed through changes to other components
of the payment system rather than the risk adjustment methods.

Variability Within groups
All of the patient classification systems used
for risk adjustment group patients into categories based on their clinical characteristics
and the similarity of their costs. But the costs
of patients within each risk category are not
identical. That is, there will always be cost
variability within each case mix group (Figure
2). The variation in costs across patients within
a group can be due to imprecise patient classification. Failure to distinguish adequately
among patients with different resource needs
can be particularly problematic if some providers are able to select low-risk patients or
avoid high-cost patients, or if some providers
systematically treat a disproportionate number of high-cost patients.

national health Policy forum | www.nhpf.org
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In general, more patient categories are needed to improve the precision of
the patient classification system when there is substantial variation across
patients and thus an increased chance of large losses or gains for individual
providers due to their mix of patients. Medicare currently uses almost 600
DRGs for payment of acute care hospital services because of the wide range
of conditions and types of patients treated. It will substantially increase the
number of DRGs with the refinements scheduled for implementation in 2008.
In contrast, payments to psychiatric hospitals are based on 15 DRGs, with
payments also varying by day of stay. There is not as much variability in the
costs of treatment across psychiatric conditions, so additional categories do
little to improve payment accuracy.
Differences in patient severity within the same DRG can result in some
patients being more profitable to treat than others, which was the reason
for the upcoming increase in the number of DRGs.10 This was demonstrated
in a Medicare Payment Assessment Commission (MedPAC) analysis of
Medicare patients hospitalized for certain heart conditions. MedPAC
grouped patients within a DRG based on their severity of illness and
then compared the Medicare payment amount with patient costs, which
varied based on patient severity. On average, Medicare payments for patients with coronary bypass with catheterization (DRG 109) were about
10 percent above hospital costs. For the least severe patients within this
DRG, payments were 47 percent above costs, and, for the most severe
patients, payments were 20 percent below costs. Thus, hospitals would be
disproportionately rewarded for treating the less severe patients within
this particular DRG. Similarly, hospitals with a disproportionate share of
the most severe patients would be financially disadvantaged.
This within-DRG cost variability has contributed to the growth in specialty
hospitals.11 Specialty hospitals are small, often physician-owned facilities
that focus on a narrow range of DRGs, such as cardiac care, orthopedics,
or surgery, that tend to be more profitable than others. Further, specialty
hospitals appear to be effective in selecting lower cost patients within the
DRGs they treat.12 This “cream skimming” allows them to profit from treating selected Medicare patients, without necessarily providing care more
efficiently than community hospitals. There are concerns that community
hospitals will have increasing difficulty covering their costs because they
will be left to treat a disproportionate share of less profitable patients. The
refinements to the DRGs and other payment system modifications are
intended to ameliorate this inequity.13
Efforts to minimize cost variation within case mix categories to recognize
differences in the resource needs of the patients may involve trade-offs
between the precision of the risk adjustment and the number of case mix
groups. A patient classification system with more categories may have
less cost variability within each group. Generally, adding patient groups
to improve the patient classification system is desirable as long as the additional groups improve payment accuracy by accounting for a significant
proportion of the variance in cost differences among groups and reduce
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the amount of variability within groups. At some point, however, there
are diminishing returns to adding more groups to the classification system
and implementation concerns might outweigh improved precision. The
concerns center on data issues, because refining patient groups generally
requires obtaining more patient-level data. Providers or plans may object
to additional reporting requirements because of increased administrative burden. The reporting tools to obtain additional data may not be
adequately tested, widely available, or sufficiently objective. Finally, additional program oversight might be needed to ensure that the new data
requirements are correctly implemented.

Changes in Medical Practice over Time
Medical practice and the costs of health care change over time, which
affects both the factors that identify patients with similar risks and the
costs of care. As a result, the patient classification system and the relative
weights attached to each patient group need to be adjusted. For example,
as the detection and treatment of certain cancers improves, the characteristics of patients admitted to a hospital for cancer care will likely
change, as will the costs of providing care. Accurate
risk adjustment requires refinement of the patient The patient classification system and
categories and recalculation of the relative weights relative weights used in risk adjustment
to reflect new technologies and treatment patterns
methods must be updated periodically
that affect who gets health care services and the type
as medical practice changes.
of services available.
Medicare annually reviews the hospital inpatient DRGs and updates, or
recalibrates, the relative weights; if needed, Medicare may also modify
DRG definitions or change the DRGs to improve the homogeneity within
the groups. Recalibration involves comparing hospital cost data for each
DRG with total average costs to recalculate the relative costs across all
groups. If there are indications that patients within a given DRG are no
longer similar with respect to their costs, Medicare might segment the DRG,
change the risk factors associated with the DRG or create a new DRG to
better account for differences in patients. Providers and other interested
parties submit information to the Medicare program if they believe that the
practice of medicine has changed enough so that current patient categories
do not distinguish adequately among patients according to their cost.
Sometimes other approaches to accounting for changes in medical practice may be needed because data are not available or adequate to modify
the risk adjustment system. There may be few cases and little cost data
with which to establish a case mix group. The patients initially receiving
a new procedure or method of delivering care may differ from the types
of patients who would receive the procedure or method once it is more
established. Such issues may be more effectively addressed through other
payment adjustments such as outlier payments, risk corridors to limit gains
or losses on particular types of patients, or partial capitation payments
until the data for refining the risk adjustment system are available.

National Health Policy Forum | www.nhpf.org

11

Background Paper
August 21, 2007

Scope of PPS Bundles
Medicare’s PPS bundles range from units as narrow as a day of care in a
psychiatric hospital to units as broad as 60 days of home health care. Under
all of Medicare’s prospective payment approaches, providers have incentives to shift services outside of the bundle to lower their costs of delivering
care to increase their profitability. Such shifting would result in Medicare
paying more than intended for the bundle of services actually provided.
Further, this practice could raise Medicare spending if it resulted in services
that will be paid for by Medicare in another setting. To account for any
change in the services provided within the payment bundle delivered by
a provider, Medicare makes adjustments in the PPS.
Before the implementation of Medicare’s PPS for inpatient hospital services,
policymakers were concerned that pre-surgical testing and other services
that had been performed during the hospital stay would be moved out of
the hospital and performed before a scheduled hospital admission in an
ambulatory setting. Although shifting these services outside the inpatient
admission might reflect more efficient delivery of care, it would result in
Medicare paying twice for the same service—once through the payment to
the ambulatory provider and again implicitly through the hospital payment.
To account for this, Medicare defined the payment bundle for inpatient care
to include all services provided during the hospital admission as well as
any tests performed within the three-day window prior to admission. In
this way, the Medicare program financially protected itself from changes to
the set of services provided at the beginning of a hospital stay.
Over time, hospital inpatient length of stay has declined markedly. This was
an expected response to the PPS, as hospitals became more efficient in scheduling services within the hospital stay. In contrast, admissions to post-acute
care settings (for example, SNF, home health agencies, and rehabilitation
hospitals) rose, suggesting that recovery and rehabilitation services that had
been part of the hospital bundle were being shifted to other settings. To help
ensure that it is not paying more than intended to the hospital and again
for the same service in the post-acute site, Medicare reduces the hospital
payment when patients in particular DRGs are transferred to a post-acute
site before they have stayed at least the average time for the group.

Gaming
Providers have incentives to ensure that patients are categorized in the
highest paying category possible, so any changes to the risk factors that are
used to assign patients to case mix groups need to ensure that the factors are
not likely to be gamed. Gaming, also known as upcoding, would result in a
patient being assigned to a higher paying group even though the resource
needs of the patient are not similar to the average needs of patients in that
group. Any modification to a payment system or its risk adjustment method
being considered needs to account for documentation and coding changes
that could provide opportunities to shift patients to higher paying groups
without commensurate increases in resource requirements. Particular care
needs to be taken to ensure that risk factors are objective and verifiable.
National Health Policy Forum | www.nhpf.org
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When the acute care hospital PPS was implemented, the number of complicating conditions or comorbidities (CC) assigned to patients increased
markedly because the presence of a CC often resulted in the patient’s classification into a higher paying DRG. The patients and the costs of caring
for them had not changed, but the documentation and coding of these
risk factors had changed. As a result, payments to hospitals increased
more than warranted. A similar issue was identified in the home health
PPS.14 Even though a higher proportion of patients were categorized in the
more intensive case mix groups, the average resource use of home health
patients had not increased. This indicates that either the documentation
and coding of patient characteristics that are used to assign them to case
mix groups changed or that home health agencies reduced the services
provided to their patients.
The incentives in the PPSs are to record or
document risk factors in the most financially Changes to risk assessment methods may
advantageous way possible. Although report- introduce opportunities to shift patients into
ing false information about a patient would be higher paying groups without commensufraud, there are often variations in assessments
rate increases in resource requirements.
and judgment that can affect the classification.
For example, the patient classification system used in the SNF setting relies
in part on an assessment of the patient’s ability to perform activities of daily
living. The provider has to rate the patient’s ability to transfer from the
chair to bed. Does the patient require moderate help or extensive help? The
answer to this question alone may not affect the patient’s case mix group
determination, but several of these types of judgments could.15
Some patient classification systems rely on service use as a risk factor, even
though it is a direct measure of costs. For example, SNF patients who were
assessed as needing between 325 and 499 minutes of therapy were categorized into the high rehabilitation group. This reliance on expected service use
resulted in a change in patient assessments. Between 1999 and 2001, SNFs
reduced the minutes of therapy provided to these patients from an average of
325 minutes to 255 minutes, resulting in lower costs of providing care for the
same Medicare payments.16 This may reflect an improvement in the efficiency
of providing care—if the patient outcomes remained the same—but it could
also reflect inappropriate reductions in services to achieve higher profits.

Future Directions for Risk Adjustment:
Performance and Outcome Comparisons
In addition to serving as a fundamental component of Medicare payment
systems, risk adjustment is also needed as Medicare, other payers, and researchers compare the costs or outcomes of providers and treatments.17 These
types of comparisons are likely to become more important as payers continue
to focus on steady increases in health care spending without commensurate
increases in patient outcomes. (See next page for an illustration.) All else
Continued on p. 15 ä
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Risk Adjustment in Performance and
Outcome Comparisons : An Illustration
To illustrate the importance of risk adjustment in comparing performance and outcomes, examine the hypothetical experience of two hospitals, Mercy Hospital and Community Hospital, that treat two types of
patients. Patients in group A have had no prior heart attack. Patients in group B have had one or more heart
attacks. The mortality rate is 9 percent
	Actual Mortality Rates, by Group and Hospital
for group A and 16 percent for group B
across all hospitals. Mercy Hospital apMercy
Community
Hospital
Hospital
Overall
pears to have better outcomes because its
No. of Cases
actual (that is, unadjusted) mortality rate
80
20
100
is 12 percent, compared with 13 percent
Deaths
Group A
8
1
9
for Community Hospital. This, however,
Mortality Rate
10%
5%
9%
is an artifact of the mix of patients in
No. of Cases
20
80
100
the two hospitals. Mercy Hospital has a
Deaths
Group B
4
12
16
higher proportion of patients in group
Mortality Rate
20%
15%
16%
A—the less severe cases—than CommuNo. of Cases
100
100
—
nity Hospital. Mercy Hospital has worse
Total by
Deaths
12
13
25
Hospital
outcomes for both patient groups, but beMortality Rate
12%
13%
—
cause only 20 percent of its patients are in
group B—the more severe patients—its
Without considering the mix of patients, Mercy Hospital has a lower
overall mortality rate appears lower.
mortality rate than Community Hospital.
A comparison of risk-adjusted, or expected, mortality provides a more accurate picture of outcomes in the
two hospitals. The expected mortality rate reflects what the mortality rate would be if the hospital had the
same percentage of deaths for each group as the overall average. The expected mortality for Mercy Hospital,
given its mix of patients, is 10.4 percent. The risk-adjusted mortality is lower than its actual mortality rate of
12 percent. By comparison, Community Hospital’s expected, or risk-adjusted, mortality rate is higher than
its actual mortality rate. Given its mix of patients, the expected mortality rate in Community Hospital is 14.6
percent, but its actual mortality rate is 13 percent, or 11 percent lower.
Difference Between
Actual and Expected
Mortality Rates

Expected Mortality Rates,
by Hospital
Expected Mortality Rate by Group
GROUP A

GROUP B

Overall Expected
Mortality Rate

Mercy
Hospital

80 X 9% = 7.2%

20 X 16% = 3.2%

7.2% + 3.2% = 10.4%

Community
Hospital

20 X 9% = 1.8%

80 X 16% = 12.8% 1.8% + 12.8% = 14.6%

Expected mortality rates are calculated by applying the overall mortality rate
by group to the number of cases for each group, and then summing across
all groups.
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Mercy
Hospital

Community
Hospital

Actual

12.0%

13.0%

Expected

10.4%

14.6%

Percentage
Difference

+15.4%

–11.0%

After considering the mix of patients,
Community Hospital has a lower mortality rate than Mercy Hospital.
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Continued from p. 13

being equal, riskier patients—either people with more health problems or
more severe health issues—are probably more costly to treat than others.
Similarly, the treatment outcomes for patients who have fewer health issues
or less severe ones are likely to be better. As a result, assessments of the best
treatment approach must account for the starting point of the patient. Failure to adjust properly for differences in clinical risk can lead to erroneous
conclusions when making comparisons.
In the mid 1980s, Medicare began publishing risk-adjusted mortality rates
for all U.S. hospitals treating Medicare beneficiaries. Claims data were
used to perform the risk adjustment. However, the uproar caused by the
release of these data, including concerns about the adequacy of the risk
adjustment methodology for reporting all-cause mortality, brought that
effort to an end by 1993. Currently, a number of states (for example, New
York, California, Vermont, and Oregon) produce reports that compare
provider performance based on risk-adjusted mortality rates. Generally,
these reports focus on mortality rates for a specific medical condition,
such as coronary artery bypass graft surgery, to narrow the risk differences across patients.
Increasingly, Medicare and other payers are investigating differences in the
quality of care provided and the outcomes of health care treatment to use
in adjusting payments to reward better performance or greater improvements in performance. These new uses of risk adjustment may require
more sophisticated methods than those currently in use.

Conclusion
Adequate risk adjustment is critical to Medicare’s efforts to pay providers and
health plans appropriately and to provide incentives for them to deliver care
efficiently. In its prospective payment systems and managed care program,
Medicare needs to ensure adequate compensation to providers or plans to
maintain access to care for beneficiaries who are likely to incur higher than
average costs. Payments and premiums also need to be calibrated correctly
for low-cost beneficiaries to ensure that the financial benefit of caring for
them is not greater than the benefit of caring for others. Although the concept of aligning payments with expected costs is straightforward, the actual
process is complex and requires continual improvements. As providers and
payers gain more experience with risk-adjusted payments and as practice
patterns and treatment protocols change, risk adjustment methodologies
need to be updated to continue to be effective.
The importance of risk adjustment in the health care environment is expanding beyond provider and plan payments. With more attention focused
on health care spending and differences in spending across geographic
areas and types of providers, efforts to identify best practices or alternative treatment options will intensify. One of the methods for doing this
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involves comparing resource use and outcomes, but these comparisons
are valid and useful only when they adequately account for differences
in the risk of patients or populations involved. Current methods may be
adequate for adjusting payments or premiums, particularly in conjunction
with other payment policies. When decisions about selecting the most appropriate treatment option are based on comparisons of patient outcomes,
the consequences of differences in patients that affect the comparisons may
be even more important.
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